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Asymmetric Information and Intermediation Chains†
By Vincent Glode and Christian Opp*
We propose a parsimonious model of bilateral trade under asymmetric information to shed light on the prevalence of intermediation
chains that stand between buyers and sellers in many decentralized markets. Our model features a classic problem in economics
where an agent uses his market power to inefficiently screen a privately informed counterparty. Paradoxically, involving moderately
informed intermediaries also endowed with market power can
improve trade efficiency. Long intermediation chains in which each
trader’s information set is similar to those of his direct counterparties limit traders’ incentives to post prices that reduce trade volume
and jeopardize gains to trade. (JEL D42, D82, D85, L12, L14)
Transactions in decentralized markets often feature the successive involvement of multiple intermediaries. In this paper, we propose a parsimonious model
of bilateral trade to study the implications of these types of arrangements in the
presence of asymmetric information. Our model initially considers two asymmetrically informed agents who wish to trade an asset in order to realize gains
to trade. One agent has market power in pricing the asset, whereas his counterparty is privately informed about the value of the asset. A standard result in models like ours is that trade breaks down with positive probability when the potential
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gains to trade are small relative to the underlying information asymmetry—rent
seeking via socially inefficient screening reduces the expected surplus from
trade.
Yet we show that involving a moderately informed intermediary, whose information quality ranks between the buyer’s and the seller’s, can improve efficiency. By
layering trade over two sequential transactions rather than one, this form of intermediation may better incentivize efficient trading behavior by all agents involved.
The benefits of a moderately informed intermediary further extend to settings where
several intermediaries trade an asset sequentially, as part of an intermediation chain
in which each trader’s information set is similar, although not identical, to those of
his direct counterparties. Thus, in contrast to other theories that highlight the benefits of a single intermediary, our analysis provides a rationale for why assets may
be traded through long intermediation chains rather than through simpler networks
centered around one dominant broker.
Below we provide a simple example aimed at illustrating the intuition behind our
main results.
Illustrative Example.—The monopolist seller of an asset (or good) must choose
the price he will quote to a potential buyer (or customer) as a take-it-or-leave-it
offer. The seller is, however, uncertain about how much the buyer is willing to pay
for the asset. In particular, the seller only knows that the buyer’s valuation of the
asset, which we denote by v , has a uniform distribution: v ∼ U [1, 2]. The buyer only
accepts to pay a price pif v ≥ p; otherwise, the seller must retain the asset, which
for now, is assumed to be worth a constant value c < 1to him. The seller’s optimization problem can then be summarized as follows:






 Π
 ( p)  = P 
r (v ≥ p) p + P 
r (v < p) c =  (2 − p) p +  ( p − 1) c.
(1)	
  max
p∈[1, 2]





Concavity of Π
 ( · )implies that when Π′(1)   = c ≤ 0, the seller quotes a price p = 1,
which is always accepted by the buyer. Thus, trade occurs with probability 1if and
only if c ≤ 0, which is the socially efficient outcome since the buyer always values the asset more than the seller. However, if the seller’s valuation of the asset is
c > 0, the seller finds it optimal to quote p > 1and use his market power to screen
the privately informed buyer, inefficiently destroying gains to trade with positive
probability.
Now suppose that we involve an intermediary who, like the seller, only values the
asset at c. Given this private valuation, the intermediary only helps realize gains to
trade if he resells the asset to the buyer. What may facilitate allocative efficiency is
the fact that this intermediary is assumed to be moderately informed, in the sense
that he obtains a signal indicating whether v ∈ [1, 1.5)or v ∈ [1.5, 2], that is, the
signal pools either a bove-median or b elow-median realizations of the buyer’s valuation of the asset. The intermediary is thus better informed than the original seller,
but less informed than the buyer. The seller first quotes a price to the intermediary. If
the intermediary accepts to pay this price and obtains the asset he then quotes a price
to the buyer. Using backward induction, we show that trade may now be efficient
even when c > 0.
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Conditional on holding the asset and knowing that v < 1.5, the intermediary’s
optimization problem when quoting a price to the buyer is


1.5 − p
p−1

(2)   max P
  
r (v ≥ p | v < 1.5) p + P 
r (v < p | v < 1.5) c = (_
 
 
   p + (_
   c.
)
0.5
0.5 )

p∈[1, 1.5) 

The fi
 rst-order condition of this problem implies that the seller quotes a socially
efficient price p = 1if and only if c ≤ 0.5. Similarly, conditional on holding the
asset and knowing that v ≥ 1.5, the intermediary’s optimization problem can be
written as


2−p
p − 1.5

(3)   max
 Pr 
  
 (v ≥ p | v ≥ 1.5) p + P 
r (v < p | v ≥ 1.5) c = (_
 
   p + (_
 
   c.
0.5 )
0.5 )

p∈[1.5, 2] 

Here, the fi
 rst-order condition implies that the seller quotes a socially efficient price
p = 1.5if and only if c ≤ 1. Overall, the intermediary thus always quotes a socially
efficient price as long as c ≤ min {0.5, 1}   = 0.5.
Now, consider the seller’s problem provided that this condition is satisfied
(c ≤ 0.5) and the seller anticipates that trade between the intermediary and the
buyer will be efficient. Facing the intermediary, the seller then optimally chooses
between quoting a price p = 1, which is always accepted, and a price p = 1.5,
which the intermediary only accepts if he receives a signal that v ≥ 1.5. Thus, the
seller chooses to quote a price p = 1rather than p = 1.5if and only if
(4)	1 ≥ 0.5 · 1.5 + 0.5 · c,
which simplifies to c ≤ 0.5.Together, these conditions imply that intermediated
trade is efficient as long as c ≤ 0.5, whereas direct trade can only be efficient if
c ≤ 0.
It is helpful to interpret this result by considering the t rade-off between the probability of a sale and the payoff the seller collects conditional on a sale. The more dispersed the seller’s beliefs about the buyer’s valuation are, the less the seller reduces
the probability of trade when increasing his price quote. A seller with more dispersed
beliefs is thus more tempted to screen the buyer by quoting higher prices, while
probabilistically destroying gains to trade. In the example above, without an intermediary the seller reduces the probability of trade by εwhen inefficiently increasing
his price quote by ε. In contrast, the intermediary finds it less profitable to screen the
buyer—given his better information and more concentrated beliefs, the intermediary
reduces the probability of trade by 2εwhen inefficiently increasing his price quote
by ε. Similarly, the original seller may find deviating from a socially efficient price
less attractive when trading with the intermediary rather than directly with the buyer.
Facing the intermediary, the seller’s beliefs about his counterparty’s valuation are
concentrated at two points, corresponding to the two possible signal realizations that
pool ranges of buyer types. A seller quoting a price that exceeds the intermediary’s
valuation of the asset given a low signal, even just marginally, is then penalized by
a large decline in the probability of trade. Overall, this simple example highlights
how replacing one monopoly problem with a large information asymmetry by two
sequential monopoly problems, each with less information asymmetry, may reduce
incentives to screen counterparties, thereby increasing the social efficiency of trade.
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We explore these results in greater detail throughout the paper by generalizing
our analysis along several dimensions. We allow for traders’ private information to
relate to common and private value components. We also generalize our distributional assumptions on vand how the intermediary’s information sets partition the
distribution. Finally, we show how involving multiple intermediaries can further
improve the efficiency of trade. In the example above, we can use similar arguments to show that the condition for efficient trade is weakened to c ≤ 0.67if trade
instead goes through a chain of two intermediaries: a first one who knows whether
v ∈ [1, 1.67)or v ∈ [1.67, 2]and a second one who knows whether v ∈ [1, 1.33),
v ∈ [1.33, 1.67), or v ∈ [1.67, 2].
When market power leads to inefficiencies, one might expect that adding layers
of intermediation would reduce efficiency due to problems of double marginalization (e.g., Spengler 1950). Our paper, however, shows that if intermediaries are partially informed, the associated reduction in the incentives to screen throughout the
intermediation chain can, somewhat paradoxically, improve efficiency. Moreover, if
private information is sufficiently dispersed, longer chains of intermediaries may be
needed to sustain efficient trade in each transaction. Greater information asymmetries thus require longer intermediation chains that involve many sequential transactions, contrasting with the conventional wisdom that asymmetric information should
be associated with low trading volume (as it is the case in the seminal model of
Akerlof 1970).
Related Literature.—Intermediation is known to facilitate trade, either by minimizing transaction costs (Townsend 1978), by concentrating monitoring incentives
(Diamond 1984), or by alleviating search frictions (Rubinstein and Wolinsky 1987;
Yavaş 1994; Duffie, Gârleanu, and Pedersen 2005; Neklyudov 2013). Our paper
specifically speaks to how intermediaries may alleviate trading inefficiencies caused
by asymmetric information and imperfect competition. We know from Myerson and
Satterthwaite (1983) that an uninformed third party who subsidizes transactions
can help eliminate problems of asymmetric information in bilateral trade. Trade
efficiency can also be improved by the involvement of fully informed middlemen
who care about their reputation (Biglaiser 1993) or who worry that informed buyers
could force them to hold on to low-quality goods (Li 1998). Contrary to these models, our setup considers the possibility that an intermediary’s information set differs
from those of the other agents already involved in the transaction. In fact, in our
static model without subsidies, warranties, or reputational concerns the involvement
of an intermediary who is equally informed as either the buyer or the seller does not
improve trade efficiency. Thus, the insight that involving moderately informed intermediaries can help solve a standard problem in economics—when an agent uses his
market power to inefficiently screen his trade partner—fundamentally differentiates
our paper from these earlier papers.
Although intermediation chains can be observed in various settings (e.g., retail
distribution networks), we rely on the recent empirical literature documenting the
importance of interdealer trading and intermediation chains in o ver-the-counter
(OTC) financial markets to contextualize our theory. According to the Bank for
International Settlements (2013), interdealer trading accounts for 3 5percent of the
$2.3trillion in daily transaction volume for OTC interest-rate derivatives. Goldstein
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and Hotchkiss (2012) find that roughly one-third of transaction volume in secondary
markets for newly issued corporate bonds is among dealers. For municipal bonds,
Li and Schürhoff (2014) show that 1 3percent of intermediated round-trip trades
involve a chain of 2 intermediaries and an additional 1 0percent of trades involve 3
or more intermediaries. Hollifield, Neklyudov, and Spatt (2014) also provide evidence of intermediation chains in the market for securitized products: for example,
intermediated round-trip trades of non-agency collateralized mortgage obligations
(CMO) involve 1.76 dealers on average and in some instances the chain includes up
to 10 dealers.
Viswanathan and Wang (2004) propose an alternative explanation for the existence of intermediation chains in OTC markets.1 In their model, a security issuer
may prefer a trading venue where dealers with heterogeneous inventory levels trade
the security sequentially to a centralized auction that splits the supply of the security among the dealers. Traders find it optimal to share inventory risk among themselves and, as a result, they resell only a fraction of their acquired position to their
respective counterparty in the chain. Although we agree that inventory risk concerns
are economically important in financial markets, these concerns cannot explain the
existence of the particular chains that Li and Schürhoff (2014) document. Li and
Schürhoff (2014) identify an intermediation chain in the municipal bond market
only when a dealer buys and then sells the same quantity of a security to another
dealer. Intermediation chains that split orders among dealers in order to share inventory risk might still be prevalent in this market, but the specific chains that Li and
Schürhoff (2014) document simply cannot be rationalized by interdealer trading
aimed at dispersing inventory through a network.
Related findings also lend support to our information-based theory of intermediation chains. Intermediaries in our model are still averse to holding inventories
(i.e., nonzero positions) since they are not the efficient holders of assets. Yet, information asymmetries may prevent them from offloading assets to potential buyers,
consistent with evidence in Jiang and Sun (2015) suggesting that the corporate bond
market is affected by significant asymmetric information problems. Consistent with
the mechanism at play in our model, Li and Schürhoff (2014) show that municipal
bonds without credit ratings or with speculative ratings are typically traded through
longer intermediation chains than municipal bonds with investment-grade ratings,
which arguably are less likely to be associated with large information asymmetries.
Further, Di Maggio, Kermani, and Song (2015) find that average chain length in
the corporate bond market increased following Lehman Brothers’ collapse, a time
during which uncertainty and the potential for information asymmetries spiked.
More broadly, our paper can shed light on the observation by Adrian and Shin
(2010, p. 604) that the whole US financial system shifted in recent decades from
its traditional, centralized model of financial intermediation to a more complex,
market-based model characterized by “the long chain of financial intermediaries
In contrast, Weller (2013) documents high-frequency trading chains in metals futures markets and proposes a
rationale for these particular chains that relies on heterogeneity in dealers’ technological ability to quickly transact
in centralized trading venues. Evaluating the effects of high-frequency trading, Jovanovic and Menkveld (2015)
also consider a model with centralized trading but focus on the idea that limit orders can be adversely selected once
new information arrives. They show theoretically and empirically that this type of adverse selection can be alleviated by the entry of high-frequency traders who refresh quotes frequently.
1
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involved in channeling funds” (see also for similar characterizations, Kroszner and
Melick 2009; Cetorelli, Mandel, and Mollineaux 2012; Pozsar et al. 2013).
Roadmap.—In the next section, we model a fairly standard bargaining problem
between two asymmetrically informed traders. We analyze in Section II how involving a moderately informed intermediary can improve trade efficiency. In Section III,
we extend our analysis to show how long chains of intermediaries may sustain
efficient trade in cases where shorter chains do not. In Section IV, we discuss the
implementation of this type of intermediation, and the last section concludes. Unless
stated otherwise, proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
I. Direct Bilateral Trade

We initially consider two risk-neutral agents who wish to trade one unit of an
asset over the counter: a potential buyer who values the asset ex post at v ∈ [vL  , vH  ]
and the current owner of the asset who values it at c (v). The function c ( · )is weakly
increasing, continuous, and satisfies c (v)   < vfor all v ∈ [vL  , vH  ]. The last condition
implies that trade always creates a surplus and is therefore efficient if and only if
the buyer obtains the asset with probability 1.2 The cumulative distribution function
(CDF) for the value v, denoted by F (v), is continuous and differentiable and the
probability density function (PDF), denoted by f (v), takes strictly positive values
everywhere on the support [vL  , vH  ]. The functions c ( · )and F ( · )are common knowledge, but traders are asymmetrically informed about v at the time of trade.
Although the role that intermediation plays in our model is relatively simple,
multilayered bargaining problems with asymmetric information are usually complex
and give rise to multiple equilibria. We therefore make a few stylized assumptions
that will allow us to keep the model tractable, even when we extend the analysis
to multiple sequential transactions occurring among a large set of heterogeneously
informed traders.
First, we assume that, in every transaction, the current holder of the asset makes
an ultimatum offer to his counterparty. Focusing on ultimatum offers simplifies the
analysis of equilibrium bidding strategies and is consistent with the characterization
of interdealer trading in financial markets by Viswanathan and Wang (2004, p. 3)
as “very quick interactions.” Ultimatum offers are also consistent with how Duffie
(2012, p. 2) describes the typical negotiation process in OTC markets and the notion
that each OTC dealer tries to maintain “a reputation for standing firm on its original
quotes.”
Second, we assume that prior to trading, the seller is uninformed about the realization of v , whereas the buyer is an expert who knows v . Note that for many financial products endowing a “buyer” with private information rather than the “seller”
is an unrestrictive assumption; for example, a firm could be viewed as the buyer of
an insurance policy, or, alternatively, as the seller of a risk exposure. Moreover, as
will become clear later, it is a trader’s temptation to inefficiently screen his privately
informed counterparty that moderately informed intermediaries may help e liminate.
2

In the context of financial markets, these gains to trade may originate from heterogeneous liquidity or hedging
needs across traders.
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This inefficient trading behavior could also arise under alternative information
structures, for example, if the roles were reversed and an uninformed buyer made an
ultimatum offer to a privately informed seller, or if both agents had their own private
information about the asset. In an earlier draft available upon request (Glode and
Opp 2015), we showed that our main results can survive in these alternative settings.
Third, agents know how well informed their counterparties are, that is, they know
the distributions of other traders’ information about v . Seppi (1990) lends support
to this assumption arguing that agents knowing the identity of their trading counterparties is an important distinction between OTC trading and centralized/exchange
trading.3
Finally, throughout the paper we also assume that in knife-edge cases where a
trader is indifferent between two actions, he picks the one that maximizes social
surplus.
Together, these assumptions imply that the proposer in our bargaining game does
not possess any superior information when making an offer to his counterparty. As a
result, signaling concerns do not arise and we obtain a unique subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium under direct trade. Moreover, our setting allows us to study a classic
problem in economics where a monopolist seller inefficiently screens buyers based
on their privately known types.
Analysis.—A s ubgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in the direct trade game consists
of a price that the seller quotes and an acceptance rule for each possible buyer type
vthat are mutual best responses in every subgame. If the seller quotes a price p ,
the buyer accepts to buy the asset whenever v ≥ p, which occurs with probability
[1 − F (p) ] .Otherwise, the seller must retain the asset, which he values at c (v). We
can write the seller’s expected payoff when quoting a price p as
(5)	
Π (p)   ≡ [1 − F ( p) ] p + F ( p) E [c (v)  | v < p] ,
where E
 denotes the expectation operator. The change in the expected payoff from
marginally increasing the price p is then given by
(6)

Π′( p)  =  [1 − F ( p) ]   − f  ( p) p + f ( p) E [c (v)  | v < p]  
∂   E [c (v)  | v < p] ,
+ F ( p) _
∂p

which simplifies to
(7)	
Π′( p)  =  [1 − F ( p) ]   − f ( p)  [ p − c ( p) ] .
The first term on the right-hand side of equation (7) represents the seller’s expected
benefit from collecting a higher price when the buyer accepts the offer. The second
3
Morris and Shin (2012) relax the common-knowledge assumption in a bilateral trading setup similar to the
one in this section and show how the resulting coordination problems can magnify the effect adverse selection has
on trade efficiency.

2706

THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW

september 2016

term represents the expected cost from reducing the probability of trade and jeopardizing trade surplus. The seller thus faces a trade-off between his payoff when a
sale occurs and the probability of a sale occurring, which is greatly influenced by
the nature of his uncertainty about the buyer’s valuation. Ceteris paribus, greater
belief dispersion, as reflected by lower values for the density f ( · ), implies that the
seller finds it less costly to increase his price quote, strengthening his incentives to
inefficiently screen the buyer.
It is useful to rewrite the seller’s marginal profit of increasing the price p as
follows:
(8)	
Π′( p)  =  [1 − F ( p) ]  [1 − H ( p) ] ,
where we define the function
f (v)
 
  [v − c (v)]   
(9)	
H (v)  ≡  _
[ 1 − F (v) ]

for v ∈ [vL  , vH  )

to represent the ratio of the above-mentioned cost and benefit of marginally increasing the price. The seller finds it optimal to quote a higher, less efficient price than
pwhenever H
 ( p)   < 1. If on the other hand H
 ( p)   ≥ 1, the benefit of collecting a
higher price is dominated by the cost of reducing the acceptance probability.
We impose the following regularity condition on the function H ( · )to guarantee
that the marginal profit function Π
 ′( · )crosses zero from above at most in one point,
which ensures that we obtain a unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium under
direct trade:
Assumption 1: H
 (v)is strictly increasing in vfor v ∈ [vL  , vH  ).
Assumption 1 is closely related to the definition of a strictly regular environment by Fuchs and Skrzypacz (2015) as well as a standard assumption in auction
theory that bidders’ virtual valuation functions are strictly increasing (Myerson
1981). Moreover, when the gains to trade are independent of v, that is, when
v − c (v)  = Δ > 0, Assumption 1 simplifies to imposing that the hazard rate function h (v)   ≡ f (v) / [1 − F (v) ]is strictly increasing. It is easy to verify that this last
condition is satisfied by the uniform distribution and by a range of (truncated)
parameterizations of the Normal distribution, the chi-squared distribution, and the
gamma distribution, to name only a few.
Socially efficient trade requires that the seller quotes a price that is accepted by
the buyer with probability 1 . Since f (v)is strictly positive everywhere on the support [v L  , vH  ], the maximum price that maintains efficient trade is p = vL  . As a result,
direct trade is efficient if and only if
(10)	
Π′(vL  )   ≤ 0,
or equivalently
(11)	
H (vL  )   ≥ 1.
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Efficient trade may thus be sustained in our setting as long as the gains to trade
[v − c (v)] are high and the seller’s beliefs are sufficiently concentrated (i.e., the
density f (v)is high enough) at the lower bound of the support. In this paper we primarily characterize the condition(s) required for efficient trade, which allows us to
isolate the benefits of intermediation, even when considering arbitrary numbers of
intermediaries (see Section III).4
II. Intermediated Trade

In this section, we consider the involvement of an intermediary who is moderately
informed, in the sense that he receives an imperfect signal about v, making him better informed than the seller but less informed than the buyer. Specifically, we assume
that the intermediary receives one of N
 possible signal realizations, each associated
with a conditional distribution F
 i  (v)for v , where i ∈ {1, 2, … , N }. The probability of
collecting each signal iis denoted by πi  > 0. We also assume that Fi  +1( · ) first-order
stochastically dominates F
 i  ( · )and we define the conditional upper and lower
_
  v i  ≡ sup {v ∈ [vL  , vH  ] : Fi  (v)   < 1}.
bounds  _ vi  ≡ inf {v ∈ [vL  , vH  ] : Fi  (v)   > 0}and 
Just like the seller, this intermediary privately values the asset at c (v)and thus cannot help realize gains to trade unless he resells the asset to the buyer and thereby
facilitates a more efficient allocation. Moreover, this intermediary does not bring
new information to the table, as his information set is nested by that of the buyer.
However, as we show below, intermediation by this moderately informed agent can
improve the efficiency of trade. We consider a simple trading network in which
the original seller can offer the asset only to the intermediary. If the intermediary
purchases the asset he can offer to sell it to the buyer. As noted above, all offers are
ultimatum offers. A s ubgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in this intermediated trade
game consists of a sequence of prices and acceptance rules for all trader types that
are mutual best responses in every subgame (including subgames that are off the
equilibrium path).
To sustain efficient trade the intermediary has to quote prices that the buyer
accepts with probability 1 . The intermediary must therefore find it optimal to quote
p =  _v ito the buyer after receiving signal i, since _  virepresents the buyer’s lowest
possible valuation of the asset. A necessary condition for efficient trade is that a
marginal deviation from this efficient price reduces the intermediary’s conditional
expected payoff, that is,
(12)	Π  ′i  (_ v i)  =  [1 − Fi  (_ v i) ]  [1 − Hi  (_ v i) ]   ≤ 0  for  i ∈ {1, 2, … , N} ,
_
fi  (v)
  1 − 
  [v − c (v)]on the domain v ∈ [ _v i,   v i). Moreover,
where we define H
 i  (v)  ≡ [_
F  (v) ]
i

if the functions Hi  (v)are strictly increasing in von their respective domains, these
Ninequalities become sufficient conditions for efficient trade between the intermediary and the buyer.

See, e.g., d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979); Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983); and Samuelson (1984)
for general analyses of the conditions required to implement first-best allocations under asymmetric information.
4
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Since the available surplus from trade [v − c(v)] does not change with the involvement of an intermediary, it is the shape of the N
 conditional distributions Fi  ( · )that dictates whether efficient trade can be sustained with an intermediary. If for some signal i
the conditional density fi    ( · )is sufficiently small at the conditional lower bound  v_ i, then
marginally increasing the price has so little impact on the probability of trade that the
intermediary finds it optimal to deviate from the socially efficient price  _ vi.5 However,
if the intermediary’s signals concentrate posterior beliefs in specific regions of the
unconditional support [vL  , vH  ]such that the conditional densities fi    ( · )are sufficiently
high at their respective lower bounds, then marginal deviations from the socially efficient price are privately suboptimal for the intermediary. As the intermediary gets to
know the buyer’s valuation with more precision, he has weaker incentives to inefficiently screen the buyer based on his private information and jeopardize gains to trade.
Efficient trade through the network also requires that the intermediary accepts the
seller’s offer with probability 1 . Since stochastic dominance implies that _  v1  = v L,
the seller has to prefer quoting a price p = vL  to the intermediary rather than higher
prices that the intermediary accepts only after receiving any of the better signals
i ≥ 2. Provided that the conditions for efficient trade between the intermediary and
the buyer are satisfied, the intermediary’s conditional valuation for the asset is given
by the price he will quote to the buyer: _  vi.
Overall, the involvement of an intermediary leads to the replacement of the condition for efficient trade under direct trade (i.e., equation (10)) by a set of (N + 1)
conditions that depend on the shapes of the conditional distributions Fi    ( · ). As we
show below, partitions are a particular type of conditional distributions that strictly
weakens the condition for efficient trade. In this regard, it is useful to establish the
following Lemma (the proof is relegated to the online Appendix).
Lemma 1: If Assumption 1 is satisfied under some distribution F
 ( · ), it is also satisfied under any truncated version of that distribution.
Assumption 1 thus guarantees that the intermediary’s conditional marginal profit
function Π  i′    ( · )also crosses zero from above at most in one point. This property
ensures that we obtain a unique s ubgame-perfect Nash equilibrium under intermediated trade.6 We can now establish our first main result.
Proposition 1: Let Ω  1(F )and Ω  0(F )denote the set of functions c ( · ) associated with efficient trade with and without an intermediary, respectively, for a given
CDF F ( · ), under Assumption 1. If the intermediary’s signal partitions the support
of v into N ≥ 2subintervals of strictly positive measure, then the set of functions
c ( · )associated with efficient trade is strictly larger with the intermediary, that
is, Ω
   0(F)   ⊂ Ω  1(F ).
5
In particular, if the intermediary’s conditional distributions have full support, then involving this intermediary
cannot eliminate all trade inefficiencies since generically for some signals the intermediary’s temptation to screen
the buyer will be higher than the original seller’s.
6
As under direct trade, a strictly increasing Hi  ( · )function implies that the intermediary’s optimal price quote to
the buyer is unique. By backward induction, the seller can anticipate the intermediary’s unique optimum response to
any price quote, which implies a unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (recall the tie-breaking rule we imposed
for knife-edge cases where a trader is indifferent between two actions).
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Proposition 1 shows that the involvement of an intermediary with a specific signal structure can facilitate efficient trade: if the intermediary’s information set partitions the interval [ vL  , vH  ]into two or more subintervals, then intermediated trade is
efficient for a strictly larger set of c ( · )functions than direct trade. This result can be
intuitively understood by considering the trade-off each potential holder of the asset
faces when choosing a price to quote. When holding the asset, a trader’s expected
surplus from quoting a price to his better informed counterparty is the difference
between the total expected surplus from trade and the information rents that can be
appropriated by all subsequent traders in the network.
As under direct trade, each potential proposer trades off the negative impact of
quoting a higher price on the probability of trade, and thus trade surplus, against the
benefit from appropriating a larger share of the whole surplus if trade is realized.
The impact of a price increase on the probability of trade is in turn affected by his
counterparty’s informational advantage, and therefore changes with the involvement
of a moderately informed intermediary.
Since the intermediary is better informed about v than the seller, the intermediary
has lower incentives to inefficiently screen the buyer to reduce his information rents.
In particular, as the intermediary’s posterior beliefs are concentrated in a subinterval of the unconditional support [vL  , vH  ], the intermediary can quote prices above vL  
without jeopardizing any gains to trade (whenever i ≥ 2). However, given that the
intermediary’s beliefs are concentrated in the ith subinterval, any price increase
beyond the conditional lower bound  viis penalized by a larger decline in the con¯
ditional probability of trade. In the limiting case where the intermediary’s partition
becomes so fine that his information set is identical to the buyer’s, a small increase
above the maximum efficient price implies that the conditional probability of trade
drops from one to zero, making such an inefficient deviation unattractive.
Further, provided that the intermediary trades efficiently with the buyer, the seller
may also be more inclined to trade efficiently with the intermediary. Intuitively,
screening is less effective when facing the moderately informed intermediary
instead of the fully informed buyer. Under direct trade, the seller can screen the
buyer by directly choosing the marginal buyer type from the continuous set [vL  , vH  ].
In contrast, when facing an intermediary who plans to resell the asset at one of the
lower bounds  _ vi, the seller is effectively restricted to choosing the marginal buyer
type from the discrete subset {v L  ,  _v 2, … ,  _ vN }; the seller’s beliefs about the intermediary’s valuation of the asset are concentrated at these N
 valuations. It follows immediately that if the seller optimally chooses the efficient price v L  under direct trade he
will also do so under intermediated trade, since the set of his alternative choices is
weakly inferior when facing the intermediary. Moreover, we show in the proof of
Proposition 1 the existence of a set of functions c ( · )for which the seller chooses a
marginally inefficient price, say p ′  > vL  , under direct trade, but picks the efficient
price p = vL  when facing the intermediary and choosing from the set {vL  ,  _v 2, … ,  _ vN }.
Overshooting to a price of _  v2is then inferior relative to v L  , as it brings about a significant reduction in the probability of trade. The larger the overshooting vis à vis
p′—that is, the higher _  v2—the less attractive is it for the seller to deviate from the
efficient price vL  when facing an intermediary.
Intermediation adds a strategic agent who uses his information and market power
to capture a share of the trade surplus. Thus, as discussed above, the seller g enerally
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faces an inferior opportunity set when facing the intermediary, and therefore, would
prefer to bypass this trader and contact the buyer directly. Yet Proposition 1 shows
that there always exist valuation functions c ( · ) (that may depend on the type of
assets being traded or the economic conditions at the time of the trade), for which
this deviation would reduce the social efficiency of trade. A trading network achieving a higher social surplus then centers around a moderately informed intermediary
and is sparse, in the sense that the seller cannot contact the buyer directly. In many
decentralized markets, it is often impossible for retail or unsophisticated traders to
contact the most sophisticated traders directly and bypass the usual middlemen. In
fact, Li and Schürhoff (2014) estimate that for the municipal bond market only 2 .4 
percent of all possible directed links are formed, highlighting that sparsity is an
empirically plausible feature of our model. Moreover, we highlight in Section IV
that ex ante transfers, such as payments for order flow, can play a beneficial role in
ensuring that the socially efficient trading network is implemented in equilibrium.
It is important to note that although involving the described intermediaries
expands the set of functions c ( · )for which efficient trade is sustained, it does not
improve trade efficiency in all cases. When direct trade is inefficient the effect of
intermediation generally depends on which buyer types are pooled by the intermediary’s signals. Consider the involvement of an intermediary who can trade efficiently with the buyer and whose partition cutoff  _ v2is located just slightly above
p′, the price that maximizes the seller’s expected payoff under direct trade. Facing
the intermediary, the seller then might quote p =  _v 2since it is the price closest to
p′ within the set {vL  ,  _v 2, … ,  _ vN }. However, since _  v2  > p′, the expected surplus from
trade shrinks with the involvement of this intermediary. In contrast, if the intermediary’s partition cutoff  _ v2is located slightly below p′, then quoting p =  _v 2to the intermediary increases the expected surplus from trade relative to direct trade, making
intermediation socially beneficial.
So far, our discussion focused on cases where the intermediary and the buyer
trade efficiently. However, when trade is expected to break down with positive probability between the intermediary and the buyer, the original seller benefits less from
trading efficiently with the intermediary. In these cases, intermediation not only
affects the sensitivity of the probability of trade to a price increase, as illustrated
above, but also the expected trade surplus at stake. Problems of double marginalization may then arise as two monopolists are sequentially trading the asset in an
inefficient manner (Spengler 1950).
While involving intermediaries strictly expands the set of cases where efficient
trade obtains, it may have ambiguous effects when trade remains inefficient. We
show in the next section, however, that in those cases lengthening the chain by
involving additional intermediaries may be sufficient to eliminate all inefficiencies.
III. Intermediation Chains

This section extends our earlier results and shows how long chains of intermediaries may sustain efficient trade in cases where shorter chains do not. In contrast
to most models of intermediation where the optimal trading network is centered
around a unique intermediary, our model sheds light on the prevalence of intermediation chains in many decentralized markets (Goldstein and Hotchkiss 2012; Bank
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for International Settlements 2013; Hollifield, Neklyudov, and Spatt 2014; Li and
Schürhoff 2014; Di Maggio, Kermani, and Song 2015).
Suppose there are M
 intermediaries, indexed by mbased on their position in a
trading chain. To simplify the notation, we label the seller as trader 0and the buyer
as trader M + 1. Each intermediary mobserves a signal that partitions the domain
[vL  , vH  ]into subintervals. The mechanism that makes intermediation chains valuable
in our model is an extension of that featured in Section II and is best highlighted by
assuming that the information set intermediary mhas before trading is nested by the
information set of intermediary ( m + 1). That is, intermediary (m + 1)observes a
signal that creates a strictly finer conditional partition than intermediary m
 ’s signal.
Formally, we make the following assumption:
_m
Assumption 2: If intermediary m
 < Mknows that v ∈ [ _v   m
i  ,   v   i  ), then interme_m
diary (m + 1)′ sinformation partitions [_ v   m
i  ,   v   i  )into at least three subintervals of
strictly positive measure.
Nesting sequential traders’ information sets in this fashion eliminates signaling
concerns and implies a unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in our model,
despite the presence of (M + 1)bargaining problems among (M + 2) heterogeneously informed agents. In this game with multiple intermediaries, the definition
of a s ubgame-perfect Nash equilibrium is the natural counterpart of the definition
stated in Section II. Assuming that there are at least three subintervals that separate
each pair of counterparties mand (m + 1)guarantees that we are able to insert a
“moderately informed” intermediary between them, if needed. This particular structure will allow us to extend some of our earlier results and show that long intermediation chains can preserve the efficiency of trade in situations where surplus would
be destroyed with fewer intermediaries. What ultimately contributes to sustaining
efficient trade in equilibrium is that the chain reduces the informational distance
between counterparties, although information sets would not necessarily have to be
nested for our mechanism to work.7
The proposition below formalizes our main result regarding intermediation
chains.
Proposition 2: Let Ω
   M(F )denote the set of functions c ( · )associated with
efficient trade in a chain of M
 intermediaries with information sets satisfying
Assumption 2 for a given CDF F
 ( · ), under Assumption 1. There exists a set of
M̃   ≥ 1intermediaries who can be added to the chain such that the set of functions
̃
c ( · )associated with efficient trade is strictly enlarged, that is, Ω  M(F )   ⊂ Ω  M+M (F ).
As before, when holding the asset a proposer’s expected payoff from quoting a
price is the difference between the total surplus from trade and the cumulative information rents going to all subsequent traders in the chain. Each proposer trades off the
negative impact of quoting a higher price on the probability of trade, and thus trade
surplus, against the benefit from appropriating a larger share of the whole surplus
In an earlier draft (Glode and Opp 2015), available upon request, we studied variants of our model with
non-nested information sets and obtained qualitatively similar results.
7
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if trade is realized. If the responder has only a small informational advantage over
the proposer, deviating from efficient trade by quoting aggressive prices imposes
large reductions in the probability of trade. Yet, provided that trade is efficient in
subsequent transactions, the surplus from trade that would be destroyed in each
transaction by quoting aggressive prices is the same. When anticipating efficient
trade in later transactions, strategies aimed at quoting inefficient prices to counterparties are thus discouraged in a long intermediation chain. Thus, by locating traders
within a chain such that each trader’s information set is similar, but not identical, to
those of his direct counterparties efficient trade can be facilitated. For example, in
the context of OTC markets the least sophisticated dealer should trade directly with
uninformed retail investors while the most sophisticated dealer should trade directly
with the best hedge funds and trading desks on Wall Street. In a nonfinancial context, our results highlight the potential benefits of multilayered distribution channels
where local retailers quote prices to privately informed customers. Proposition 2
also implies that, if the functions c ( · )and F ( · )are perturbed in ways that worsen
the efficiency of trade in a given chain, a higher number of intermediaries may be
needed to bridge the information asymmetries and sustain efficient trade, consistent
with the empirical evidence from Li and Schürhoff (2014) and Di Maggio, Kermani,
and Song (2015) discussed in our introduction.
Our results also highlight that the optimality of a trading network greatly depends
on the trading frictions that are most relevant in a given context. When trade is
impeded by inefficient screening of privately informed counterparties, our model
shows that multiple heterogeneously informed intermediaries may improve the
social efficiency of trade. When private information relates to traders’ past behavior instead, Babus (2012) shows that optimal trading networks should be centered
around a single intermediary who penalizes anyone defaulting on prior obligations
(see also Farboodi 2014). Further, Gofman (2011) shows that in the presence of
noninformational bargaining frictions, socially efficient outcomes may be easier to
achieve when networks are dense (although the relationship between density and
efficiency is not always monotonic).8 In contrast, in our model a trading network
needs to be sufficiently sparse to sustain efficient trade; otherwise, less informed
parties have incentives to directly contact highly informed traders and inefficiently
screen them. We discuss in the next section the role that payments for order flow
can play in alleviating problems of this type. Given that some trading frictions are
more relevant in some situations than in others, our results and those derived in the
papers mentioned above can help us understand the types of networks we observe
in different contexts.
Note also that the decentralized market structure we study is empirically prevalent and contrasts with alternative interventions that promote greater competition
by centralizing traders’ interactions. In particular, if multiple informed traders were
to bid simultaneously for the seller’s asset and a Crémer and McLean (1988)-type
mechanism was allowed, the seller could use competition to effectively extract
information from bidders. This competition effect is, however, absent in our setting
where trade is bilateral and the asset moves through each trader sequentially. The
See also Wright and Wong (2014) who study the impact of n on-informational bargaining and search frictions
on trade in chains of intermediaries.
8
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seller does not extract any information from competing bidders, but rather faces
a single intermediary who is less informed than the ultimate buyer. This smaller
information gap between the seller and his counterparty strengthens the seller’s
incentives to quote an efficient price. Further, as highlighted by Biais, Martimort,
and Rochet (2000), while moving from a monopolistic to an oligopolistic market
structure may reduce incentives to inefficiently screen privately informed agents in
the presence of adverse selection, it generally does not completely eliminate these
inefficiencies. Hence, equilibrium trading volume under oligopolistic screening is
below its socially optimal level, just as in the monopoly case. The intermediation
chains we study feature decentralized, sequential trading among heterogeneously
informed agents and are thus different from these alternative mechanisms.
IV. Implementation

So far, we have shown that intermediated trade can improve trade efficiency
when traders have incentives to inefficiently screen their privately informed counterparties. In this section, we consider a network-formation game that precedes the
trading game from Section III. We characterize o rder-flow agreements that traders
commit to ex ante, that is, before information is obtained and trading occurs. These
order-flow agreements ensure that no trader involved in an intermediation chain
that sustains efficient trade will be tempted to form an alternative trading network.
Order-flow agreements can thus help implement socially optimal trading networks
in our model, shedding light on potential downsides of recent proposals by regulators and stock exchange officials to ban related practices in financial markets.9
Definition 1: Consider an economy with a set of traders . An order-flow agreement Σ
 between a subset of traders  ⊆ specifies the following objects:
(i) A collection of directed network links: each trader m ∈  is exclusively connected to a unique counterparty m
 ′ ∈ { \ m} to which trader m
  quotes an
ultimatum price whenever he wishes to sell.
(ii) A collection of ex ante transfers between the traders in .
A key component of these o rder-flow agreements are ex ante transfers that incentivize traders to commit to transacting with specific counterparties. In financial
markets, these transfers may come in the form of explicit agreements involving
cash payments for order flow or soft dollars, or they may be implicit arrangements involving profitable IPO allocations or subsidies on the various other services that intermediaries provide. In fact, there is ample empirical evidence that
“perks” are commonly used by financial intermediaries to compensate traders for
See, for example, the comments made by Jeffrey Sprecher (CEO of Intercontinental Exchange, which owns
the New York Stock Exchange), reported in “ICE CEO Sprecher Wants Regulators to Look at ‘Maker-Taker’
Trading” by Christine Stebbins (Reuters.com, January 26, 2014); “Guidance on the Practice of ‘Payment for Order
Flow,’” prepared by the Financial Services Authority (May 2012); and the comments made by Harvey Pitt (former Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman), reported in “Options Payment for Order Flow Ripped” by
Isabelle Clary (Securities Technology Monitor, May 3, 2004).
9
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their business (see, e.g., Blume 1993; Chordia and Subrahmanyam 1995; Reuter
2006; Nimalendran, Ritter, and Zhang 2007). Further, for many types of securities,
order-flow agreements are required to be disclosed in advance in Rule 606 reports.
Thus, just like in our definition above, transfers linked to o rder-flow agreements do
not vary based on transaction-specific information (i.e., a particular realization of v ),
but they may vary based on the expertise of the traders involved (as documented by
Easley, Kiefer, and O’Hara 1996). This characterization distinguishes these ex ante
transfers from the transfers that occur ex post when transaction prices are paid as
part of the trading process.
In the n etwork-formation game we consider, each trader’s payoff is the sum of
these ex ante transfers and continuation payoffs that are consistent with the equilibrium outcome(s) of the trading game described in Section III. We define an equilibrium of this network-formation game as follows.
Definition 2: An order-flow agreement Σbetween a set of traders  ⊆  constitutes an equilibrium of the network-formation game if there is no coalition of traders ′ ⊆ that can block the agreement, that is, there does not exist an order-flow
agreement Σ′ that only includes traders in   ′ and that makes every trader in   ′
weakly better off and at least one trader in    ′ strictly better off.
Consistent with our previous analysis, we are interested in the cases for which
intermediation chains help sustain efficient trade. As noted above, networks satisfying Assumption 2 have a unique equilibrium in the trading game and thus unique
continuation payoffs for all traders. Below we characterize the existence of equilibrium o rder-flow agreements that support the type of intermediation chains we
introduced in Section III (the proof is relegated to the online Appendix).
Proposition 3: If the set contains traders endowed with information sets consistent with Assumption 2 who can form a chain that would sustain efficient trade in
the trading game:
(i) Any order-flow agreement that would not sustain efficient trade is not an
equilibrium in the network-formation game.
(ii) For any intermediation chain that would sustain efficient trade, there exists
a corresponding o rder-flow agreement that constitutes an equilibrium in the
network-formation game.
The result in Proposition 3 relies on the following logic. Suppose there exists
an equilibrium in which the trading network is such that the equilibrium of the
subsequent trading game is inefficient. Then, agents can create a new coalition that
includes all traders that can sustain efficient trade and offer e x ante transfers to all
agents that were in the original network while also collecting the additional surplus
that is available when trade is efficient. This set of agents thus constitutes a blocking
coalition, a contradiction.
In our model, deal-flow is valuable to intermediaries because they extract information rents and thus obtain a fraction of the total surplus from trade E
 [v − c (v) ].
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Intermediaries are willing to offer cash payments, or subsidized services, to the
ultimate buyer and seller of the asset if these are required concessions for being
involved in the trading network.
V. Conclusion

This paper shows that chains of moderately informed intermediaries may alleviate trading inefficiencies associated with the screening of privately informed counterparties by traders with market power. Layering trade over multiple sequential
transactions that involve moderately informed intermediaries can weaken each trader’s incentives to screen counterparties, and thereby increase the efficiency of trade.
Greater information asymmetries may thus be better bridged by long intermediation
chains in which each trader’s information set is similar, although not identical, to
those of his direct counterparties. We note, however, that in cases where efficient
trade is not achievable despite the presence of intermediaries, intermediation may
sometimes make trade more fragile as problems of double marginalization can arise.
A full characterization of the environments where heterogeneously informed intermediaries either improve or worsen the efficiency of trade in markets with private
information is left for future research.
Appendix
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1:
 (F)denote the set of functions
We will first show that Ω
   0(F)   ⊆ Ω  1(F). Let Ψ
c ( · )consistent with the regularity condition stated in Assumption 1 for a given CDF
F ( · ). We can thus characterize the set Ω
   0(F) as
(A1)	
Ω  0(F)  =  {c ∈ Ψ (F) :  Π′ (v L  )   ≤ 0} .
Trade between the Intermediary and the Buyer.—To show that
c ∈ Ω  0(F)   ⇒ c ∈ Ω  1(F), we first show that the intermediary, when holding the
asset, quotes a price that the buyer accepts with probability 1, provided that
_
v  i,   v i), he
c ∈ Ω  0(F). If the intermediary receives a signal ithat implies that v ∈ [ _
chooses a price pto maximize his conditional expected payoff:
(A2)	
Πi( p)  = [1 − Fi  ( p)]  p + Fi  ( p) E [c (v) | v < p, i] .

_
By Lemma 1, Hi  (v)is strictly increasing on [ _v i,   v i )and a sufficient condition for
efficient trade between the intermediary and the buyer is
(A3)	Π  ′i  (_ v i)  =  [1 − Fi  (_ v i) ]  [1 − Hi  (_ v i) ]   ≤ 0.

 ′ (vL  )   ≤ 0, or equivalently,
By definition, for all c ∈ Ω  0(F)we know that Π
H (vL  )   ≥ 1. We now show that Hi  (_ v i)   > H (vL  )for all i, which allows us to conclude
that the intermediary quotes a socially efficient price, since H
 (vL  )   ≥ 1then implies
that H
 i  (_ v i)   > 1and equivalently, Π  i′  (_ v i)   < 0, for all i ∈ {1, … , N }.
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When _  vi  > v Lwe obtain the inequality
f ( _v i)
(A4)	H i(_ v i)  =  __________
    
   [_ v   − c ( _v i)]
_
[ F (  v i )   − F ( _v i) ] i
f ( _v i)
≥  _______
 
   [_ v   − c ( _v i)]= H ( _v i)   > H (vL  ) ,
[ 1 − F ( _v i) ] i

_
and when  v i  < v H, we obtain

f ( _v i)
(A5)	H i( _
v  i)  =  __________
    
   [_ v   − c ( _v i)]
_
[ F (  v i)   − F ( _v i) ] i

f ( _v i)
>  _______
 
   [_ v   − c ( _v i)]= H ( _v i)   ≥ H (vL  ) .
[ 1 − F ( _v i) ] i

Trade between the Seller and the Intermediary.—Next, we show that the seller
quotes the intermediary a price of v L  rather than any of the price candidates  _ vi for
i ∈ {2, 3, … , N + 1}, where we define  _ vN + 1  ≡ v H. We can restrict our attention to
this discrete set of price candidates, since any prices lying between these price candidates are strictly dominated: these intermediate prices imply the same probability
of trade as the n ext-higher price in the set, but a lower sales price. Thus, provided
that the conditions for efficient trade between the intermediary and the buyer are
satisfied, a sufficient condition for efficient trade between the seller and the intermediary is
(A6)	
vL    ≥ [1 − F ( _v i) ] _v i  + F ( _v i) E [c (v)  | v <  _v i]   for

i ∈ {2, … , N + 1} .

 ( p)introduced in equation (5) and
At the cutoffs _  vi, we can use the function Π
rewrite equation (A6) as
(A7)	
Π ( _
v  i)  − Π (vL  )   ≤ 0 for i ∈ {2, … , N + 1} .
This representation shows that, when facing the intermediary, the seller’s expected
payoff is weakly lower than under direct trade: the discrete set of attainable expected
v2  ) , … , Π (vH  ) }is a strict subset of the continuous set of expected
payoffs {Π (vL  ) , Π (_
payoffs attainable under direct trade, { Π (v) }v∈[vL  , vH  ]. It follows immediately that if
the seller does not want to deviate from the efficient price vL  under direct trade he
will not wish to do so under intermediated trade as well. To summarize, since we
have shown that both the intermediary and the seller trade efficiently under intermediated trade whenever direct trade is efficient, it follows that Ω  0(F)   ⊆ Ω  1(F).
It remains to be shown that Ω  0(F)   ⊂ Ω  1(F), that is, there exist functions c ( · )
such that c ∈ Ω  1(F)but c ∉ Ω  0(F). We can write the seller’s expected payoff from
deviating from the socially efficient price as follows:
(A8)	
Π ( _v i)  − Π (vL  )  = ∫v    Π′ (z) dz  .
L
 _ vi
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Since Π
 ′ ( · )crosses zero from above at most in one point on the support [vL  , vH  ],
it follows that Π
 ′ (vL  )   ≤ 0implies that Π ( _v i)   − Π (vL  )   < 0for all i ≥ 2. That is,
when facing the intermediary, deviating from the efficient price makes the seller
strictly worse off. The same property of Π
 ′ ( · )implies that if Π
 ( _v 2)   − Π (vL  )   ≤ 0
   1(F)
then Π
 ( _v i)   − Π (vL  )   ≤ 0for all i ≥ 2. We can therefore characterize the set Ω
as follows:
(A9)	
Ω  1(F)  =  {c ∈ Ψ (F) :  Π ( _v 2)  − Π (vL  )   ≤ 0,{Π  ′i  (_ v i)   ≤ 0}   ∀ i∈N} .
By continuity of the set Ψ
 (F), there exists a subset of functions c ∈ Ω  0(F) for
which the condition for efficient direct trade holds with equality, that is, where
Π′ (vL  )   = 0. Consider replacing any one of these functions c (v)by a perturbed function c ̃ (v, ϵ)   ≡ c (v)  + ϵ, where ϵ ≥ 0is bounded from above to ensure that c̃ (v, ϵ)
still satisfies the regularity condition v − c̃ (v, ϵ)   > 0for all v ∈ [vL  , vH  ]. Define the
overall slack across all efficiency conditions in the presence of the intermediary
under such a function c̃ (v, ϵ) as


 {Π ( _v 2)  − Π (vL  ) ,{Π  ′i  (_ v i) }∀ i∈N} .
 
(A10)	
ρ ̃ (ϵ)  ≡ −max


Note that all Π 
 ′i  (_ v i)are continuous and strictly increasing in ϵand so is the difference
Π ( _v 2)   − Π (vL  ). Moreover, applying the maximum operator to a set of continuous
and strictly increasing functions yields a continuous and strictly increasing function.
Thus, ρ̃ (ϵ)is continuous and strictly decreasing in ϵ .
We showed above that when the condition for efficient direct trade holds with
equality (Π′ (vL  )   = 0) then, after introducing an intermediary, all conditions for efficient trade hold with strict inequality, i.e., ρ̃ (0)   > 0. By continuity of ρ̃ (ϵ) there
exist strictly positive values for εsuch that ρ̃ (ϵ)   ≥ 0, implying that c̃ (v, ϵ)   ∈ Ω  1(F).
Yet, since we started with a function c (v)  = c̃ (v, 0)for which Π′ (vL  )   = 0, these perturbed functions c ̃ (v, ϵ)will imply that Π
 ′ (vL  )   > 0such that c ̃ (v, ϵ)   ∉ Ω  0(F). It thus
follows that the set of functions c (v)that satisfy efficient trade with the intermediary
is strictly larger than the one without the intermediary, that is, Ω  0(F)   ⊂ Ω  1(F). ∎
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2:
The logic of this proof is similar to the one of Proposition 1. Yet the notation is
more involved as we need to keep track of multiple layers of intermediation. In the
following we will use the subscript mto identify trader m
 ’s information set. For
 ’s information set, Em  [v]is the expecexample, F
 m  (v)is the CDF of v given trader m
tation of v given trader m
 ’s information set, and
(A11)	
Πm( p)  ≡ [1 − Fm  ( p)]  p + Fm  (p)Em  [c (v)  | v < p] .

_m
m + 1) knows that
If trader m
 < Mknows that v ∈ [ _v   m
i  ,   v   i  )then trader (
vis in one of the 
K (m + 1, i)   ≥ 3
non-overlapping subintervals assowhere _  v  m
ciated with the boundaries w

j  (m + 1, i),
i   = w0  (m + 1, i)  
_m
< w1  (m + 1, i)  < ⋯ < wK  (m + 1, i)   =   v   i  . Thus, wj  (m + 1, i)denotes the jth
partition cutoff of trader (m + 1)’s information set if trader m
 observes signal
i ∈ Nm  . For a given F ( · )and a given chain with Mintermediaries we define Ω  M(F)
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as the set of functions c ( · )that satisfy all conditions for efficient trade along the
chain:
(A12) Ω  M(F)   = {c ∈ Ψ (F) : {Π  ′M (   _v   M
 i∈NM  ,
i  )   ≤ 0}∀
	
{Πm(w1  (m + 1, i))  − Πm
 (w0  (m + 1, i) )   ≤ 0 }∀ i∈Nm    ∀ m < M} ,
where Ψ (F)is defined as in the proof of Proposition 1. Also as in the proof of
Proposition 1, in any transaction between non-experts (m < M), we can focus on
verifying the profitability of a trader m
 ’s deviation from a marginal type w
 0  (m + 1, i)
  crosses zero from above at most
to the type w1  (m + 1, i)due to the fact that Π  ′m (v)
once (in one point).
By continuity of the set Ψ (F), there exist functions c ∈ Ω  M(F)such that for some
transaction between traders mand (m + 1)the condition for efficient trade holds
with equality after some signal i, that is, either:
 (w0  (m + 1, i) )   = 0  if  m < M
(A13)	
Πm
 (w1  (m + 1, i) )  − Πm
or
(A14)	
Π  ′M (   _v   M
i  )  = 0  if  m = M.
We will show next that the conditions for efficient trade hold with strict
inequality if we introduce a particular intermediary 
m̃ between these two
traders 
mand 
(m + 1)
. This intermediary 
m̃ knows that 
vis in one of
K̃  ∈ {2, … , K (m + 1, i)   − 1}
non-overlapping subintervals associated with the
boundaries w
 ̃ i, where  _ v  m
i   = w0  (m + 1, i)  = w̃ 0  < w̃ 1 < ⋯ < w̃ K̃   = w K(m + 1, i)  
_m
. Moreover, if 
m < M
, these boundaries are assumed to satisfy
=   v   i  
w̃ i  ∈ {w2  (m + 1, i) , … , wK  (m + 1, i) }for all i ∈ {1, 2, … , K̃ }. Trader m̃ ’s partition
is thus a strict refinement of trader m  ’s partition, and trader (m + 1)  ’s partition is a
strict refinement of trader m̃   ’s partition. Going forward, we analyze a generic transaction in the chain characterized by the tuple ( i, m), and, for notational simplicity,
 j  (m + 1, i).
will simply write wj  when referring to w
Trade between Intermediary m
 ̃  and Trader (m + 1) if m < M.—Trader m
̃ 
observes that v ∈ [w̃ j, w̃ j + 1), where j ∈ {0, 1, … ,  K̃   − 1}. First, consider the case
where the intermediary m
 ̃ ’s signal implies that w
 ̃ j  > w 0. Analogously to arguments
 (w0  )   = 0implies that Π  ′m (
  w1  )   < 0 and
in the proof of Proposition 1, Πm(w1  )  − Πm
 m  ̃ (v)  ≥ Hm  (v)it follows that H
 m  ̃ (v)   > 1
equivalently, Hm  (w1  )   > 1. Further, since H
for all v > w1  . Thus, when w̃ j  ≥ w 1, the condition for efficient trade between traders
m̃ and (m + 1)holds with strict inequality since
 ̃ (w̃ j)  = ∫w̃ j  [1 − Fm  ̃ (z) ]  [1 − Hm  ̃ (z) ] dz < 0,
(A15)	
Πm̃ (wk  )  − Πm
wk  
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where we define k = min {s ∈ {1, 2, … , K (m + 1, i) } : ws    > w̃ j}. As for the case
where w̃ j  = w 0, we can write

(A16) Πm ̃ (w1  )  − Πm ̃ (w0  )  = ∫w0    [1 − Fm  ̃ (z) ]  [1 − Hm  ̃ (z) ] dz
w1  

w1   F  (w̃  )  − F  (z)
fm  (z)
m 1
m
____________
= ∫w0       
    
    
   1 −  ___________
  (z − c (z))   dz
[ Fm  (w̃ 1)  − Fm  (w0  ) ] [
(F
]
 m  (w̃ 1)  − Fm  (z) )

F  (w̃  )  − F  (z)
f  (z)
 w    [1 − Fm  (z) ][_
∫
  1 − F  (z)  − (_
  1 − F  (z) )
  (z − c (z))]  dz
w1  

 	

m

1

m

m

=  ________________________________________
     
    
Fm  (w̃ 1)  − Fm  (w0  )
0

m

m

1 − F  (w̃  )
 w    [1 − Fm  (z) ][1 − Hm  (z)  −  _
∫
   dz
1 − F  (z) ]
w1  

m

1

=  _______________________________
    
   
Fm  (w̃ 1)  − Fm  (w0  )
0

m

 (w0  )  − ∫w0    [1 − Fm  (z) ][_
  1 − Fm  (z)1 ]   dz
 m(w1  )  − Πm
Π
m
____________________________________
   ,
=      
Fm  (w̃ 1)  − Fm  (w0  )
w1  



1 − F  (w̃  )

which means that Πm
 (w1  )   − Πm(w0  )   = 0 ⇒ Πm
 ̃ (wk  )   − Πm̃ (w̃ 0)   < 0, since
1 − F  (w̃  )
∫
  1 − F  (z) ]   dz
 w    [1 − Fm  (z) ][_
w1  

m

1

_____________________
     < 0.
(A17)	
−     
Fm  (w̃ 1)  − Fm  (w0  )
0

m

Trade between Intermediary m
 ̃  and Trader (m + 1) if m = M.—When trader
(m + 1)is the expert buyer (M + 1), the condition for efficient trade is given by
(A18)	Π  ′m (̃   w̃ j)  =  [1 − Fm  ̃ (w̃ j) ]  [1 − Hm  ̃ (w̃ j) ]   ≤ 0  ∀ j ≥ 0.
We want to show that this condition is satisfied with strict inequality when. In that case, we know that 
Hm  (w0  )   = 1
, which, according
ever Π  ′m (  w0  )   = 0
 m  ̃ (w̃ j)   > 1for all j ≥ 0.
to the derivations above, implies that H
 m  ̃ (w0  )   > 1and H
Thus, Π  ′m (  w0  )   = 0 ⇒ Π  ′m (̃   w̃ j)   < 0for all j ≥ 0.
Trade between Trader m and Intermediary m̃ .—Trader m
 quotes a socially efficient price to trader m
 ̃  when
 (w0  )   < 0.
(A19)	
Πm
 (w̃ 1)  − Πm
If m < M, that is, trader (m + 1)is not the expert buyer, then we know that
  ̃ 1  > w 1and we can rewrite this condition as
w
 (w0  )  + ∫w    Π  ′m (z)
  dz < 0.
(A20)	
Πm
 (w1  )  − Πm
w̃ 1
1
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If trader (m + 1)is the expert buyer and Π 
 ′m (  w0  )   = 0
, then we also know
 
< 0for w
 > w0  , and thus Πm
 (w̃ 1)   − Πm(w0  )   < 0.
that Π  ′m (w)  

Adding M̃   ≥ 1Intermediaries to the Chain.— Suppose that for a given function
c ( · )and a chain with Mintermediaries, there are M̃  transaction(s) in the chain
where a condition for efficient trade holds with equality (for at least one possible
signal). The derivations above imply that introducing M
 ̃ new traders, with information sets that satisfy the conditions described above, to intermediate these M
 ̃  transac̃
tions ensures that all conditions in the chain with ( M + M )intermediaries hold with
strict inequality. Now, consider replacing any one of these functions c (v)by a perturbed function c̃ (v, ϵ)   ≡ c (v)  + ϵ, where ε ≥ 0is bounded from above to ensure
that v − c̃ (v, ϵ)   > 0for all v ∈ [vL  , vH  ]. We can define the overall slack across all
efficiency conditions in the new chain with ( M + M̃ )intermediaries under the function c̃ (v, ϵ)as ρ̃ (ϵ)and use the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 1 to show
̃
that Ω
   M(F)   ⊂ Ω  M + M (F). ∎
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